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My challen,;e today i5 lo resist the !ynnny of the news cycle and put the cun-ent crisis \,iLb Iraq in . 
context. ! want to make clear 1he danger Saddam Hussein poses to his people, his neiglI~ors, Amenca 
and the world. I want 10 explain whal \\elre doing about it -- in terms of the cuffellt cns1s o,:er Iraqis 
weapons of mass de~truction program. And I want lo lay out our long term strateg)' for dealing with 
\he clu·onic problem Lhat is Saddam Hussein. 
Throughout his time in po•ver, Saddam has demonstrated again and again u tter contempt for his people, 
tbe pea·:e of hi, region and the security of the world. He pursued a hon·if1c, decade-long war of 
aLLrition a.gainsi Iran, costing at lea,t half a milli(m lives. He repeatedly unleashed chemical weapo~s 
against Iran ls soldiers and fired SCUD~ into its cit_ies. In : 988, he g_assed Kurdish cmhans 111 No!·tnern 
Iraq. In J 990. his troops inYacle.d Kuwait executwg those _w_ho res1st~cl, loot_mg the :::: ... nt_ry,_ sethng_ 
fire to 600 oil wells. spilling teu~ of milli, '\ of gallons of 011 mto the Gulf, fmng S_CUD m:ssile, al I el 
Aviv, Rivadh and ~ianama [mah-):AH-mahf. At warls encl, he brutally put down m his owr. country 
the Km·d; and Shia Arabs \\ ho rose 11p in rev oh against him. He ordered an attempt on the life of 
former President nush. Once again in 1994, he massed his army along the Kuwaiti border. Ile 
forcdull v occupied Irbil in i'/orthern Iraq in 1996. And throughout the last two decade;, Saddam !:as 
"v:lecfio de\'elop, maintain anti conceal the mosl tell'ible weapon~ kno·.vn to humanity ·· nuclear, 
_ ___, chemical and biological ·· and the mis5iles to deliver them. 
The Cniled States has actively and ccnsislenlly opposed Saddam because he has demonstrated the 
intent to threaten the stability of a region vital lo our interests. A stable :\·liddle East means we can 
better protect the free flow of oil, fight terrorism and build 5upport for a comprehensive Middle East 
peace. There is no greater challenge to the regionls stability-· and to Americals security in that region 
-· 1han Saddamls red.less pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. As President Clinton has said, the 
spread of the,e ·weapow, 10 outlaw states. and from them to ten-01i5ts and internalional criminals, is one 
of the most dangerous security threats our people will face over the nexl generation. Other countries 
have weapons of mass destruction am.I ballistic missiles. With Saddam Hussein, there is one big 
difference: he has used them. Nol once, but repeatetlly. Not only against combatants. but against 
civilians. ~ ol only against a foreign adversary, bul against his own people. And I have no doubt he 
will use !hem again if his capacity lo rebuild his arsenal is left unchecked. 
F-or the-bette:~part of this de'.'.-ade....lhe international community has \\-orl,,ed lo discover and dismantle 
Iraqis W)!D program. At the end of the Gulf \Var, Iraq was girnn 15 days to inventory and prepare 
for the destruction of its nuclear. chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. 
The U.;s.·. sc.t up a special commission of international experts, called 1:NSCOM. to make sure th.at the 
job got done -· and to monitor the situation so that Iraq did nol reconstitute its program. 
iDA.'I'E : 02/13/98 T!t-!E: 05:5C PM TO:  FRQM: PAGE: : 003·005 
E Yer since, Iraqb W[\11) compliance record had been a litany of lies, deceit and run-arounds. The full 
disclosure document on missiles Baghdad was required to produce in fifteen days, it dclil'cred -- in fi,·e 
years. \ Vhen LNSC0:\1 and the International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered facl6 that proved 
Iraq Is biological. chemical and nuclear weapon, reports 10 be grossly in.iccurate, Baghdad simply 
amended the reports. \\'hen Hussein Kamel [ka-MEL) -- Saddamls son-in-law and the architect of 
Iraqis 'vV).fD program-· defected to Jordan in 1995, B.ighdad was forced to reveal additional weapons 
stockpiles and production capacity it had insisted it did not have. Throughout, Baghdad has engaged 
the l"NSC0:'11 ilispectors in a b.igh stakes game of cat-ancl-motkse -- lyi11g to Lhem, harassing them, 
dela~·ing their acce,s to sites. flagrantly destroying e\'idence in plain view of the inspectors. 
Yet de&pile Iraqis best efforts, the inspectors have done a remarkable job. They have found and 
destroyed more of Iraq Is weapons of mass destrnction capacity than was destroyed during the Gulf 
\Var itself. This includes nearly 40,000 chemical weapons. more than 100,000 gallons of chemical 
weapons agents, 48 operational missiles, 30 warheads specially fitted for chemical and biological 
weapons, and a mas,ive biological weapons factory at Al-Hakim equipped to produce deadly antlu·ax 
and botulinum. 
But CNSCOMls jc;> is not ye1 done. Stockpiies ol chemical and biological mu11itions and a small force 
of Srnd-1ype missiles remain unaccounted for. Aud most iJ11portantly. lraq still has the capacity to 
rebuild its prnduc1ion program for biological and chemical weapons and the missiles to deliver them. 
As l.:"NSCOM has tome closer and closer to ferTeting out Iraqis remaining weapons capacity, Saddam 
Jia.s_ become increasingly determined in hi~ efforts to bloc.k the inspectors and end the inspection 
regime. 
Which brings us to the cwrent crisi~. Over the last three months, Saddam has sought to end 
CNSCOl\.f by any and every ruse. First he demanded that American inspectors be removed from the 
inspection team,. Then he tried to dictate a change in the \eamsl composition. Now he is denying 
lJNSCO~I !he free and full access it mu~t have to all sites by designating some of them IPresidcmiall 
sites or otherwise restricting the inspectors! accc~s. But as the charts behind me show, some of his 
presidential compounds are literally city-sized -· one almost as large as the district of Columbia -· witlt 
dozens of separate buildings. 
At the same time, Saddam i~ scel..ing to end the economic sanctions imposed by the United ~ations 
after the Gulf \Var·- and which should nol be lifted until Iraq complies with all L N. resolutions, 
including those on WMD. His gaml>it is clear and presents a stark danger to our national interes(s. 
Compromise l ;KSC0:0-lls integrity b~· imposing debiliLating rnndilions nspectors and Saddam 
keeps hi5 remaining weapons of mass destrnction and the capacity to p1 any m01e of them. Lift 
the sanction, and Saddam gets the money he needs to rebuild his militar. 
II is a situation we cannot lolern{e. If Saddam defies international controls here with impunity, he will 
roll on. as he has before. energized by the conclusion that the international community lost its will. 
Only our will has stopped him before. ll1e will of President Bush to lead the Gulf \.Var coalition that 
ejected Iraq from Kuwait and imposed tough conditions for the cease·fire. 
The will of President Clinton to strike hard at Iraqi intelligence headqua1ters in 1993 after its agents 
ploiled to assassinate former President Bush. The will immediately to deploy our troops, ships and 
planes lo Lhc region. as President Clinton did in 1994 when Saddam tlu·eatened to repeat his walkover 
of Kuwait. The will to lake ou\ Iraqi air defenses and extend the No Fly Zone when Saddam forcefully 
occupied Irbil in northern Iraq. 
:S:ow, once again. we must su!lllnon the will to respond firmly to Saddamls challenge io Ul\SCO:\-f and 
establish a safe haven for programs to develop weapon, of mass destruction. ·111at is exactly what we 
arc doing. From Europe lo the Persian Gulf, there is widespread consensus that Iraq must meet all its 
obligations lo the United Kations, that UKSCO!\f must be allowed to do its job effectively, and that. i1' 
diplomacy fails. Saddam Ilus~ein will bear responsibility for the consequenc.es. 
Many of our friends and allies would prefer a diplomatic solution. So would we. The UKSCOM 
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system works -- thatls why Saddam is so desperate to end it. \Ve will spare no diplomatic effort to 
gain unfettered access for UNSCOM and to assure i1 can clo its job effectively. We will not accept any 
proposal that would weaken CNSCOMls effectiveness. 
In pursuit of these objectives. President Clinton has been in conlacl \,ith his counterpai1s nearly every 
day over the rasL few weeks. He dispatched Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen to Europe and 
the '-·liddle East-· a11d Ambassador Richardson literally around (he world. If there is a peaceful way to 
convince Saddam to let UJ\SCO:\I complete its mission, we will pur~ue it until the end. 
But if Iraq continues to tie U~SCOMls hands, as Chairman Butler has said, it cloesnlt much matter if 
the in~pector; are holed up in a hotel in Baghdad. or in Bahrain, or in Boston. If they are not allowed 
to do their job unhindered, we must be prepared to deal directly with (he threaL posed by Iraqis 
weapons of mass de,lruction -- with force if necessary. Either Saddam Hussein acts -- or we mu• be 
prepared to do so. 
For the past several weeks, the C nited States has built up i1s forces in the Gulf. As I speak, two 
American caJTier baltle groups and over 300 aircraft are in the region. They are joined by the British 
aircraft can'ier Invincible. And we continue to receive support for action, should it prove necessary. 
Our force posture in the region would not. be possible without the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain. the GCC states, and Turkey. And many friends and allies -- including the United Kingdom. 
Germany, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Lhe Czech Republic, Australia, Kew Zealand 
and Canada -- arc prepared to provide forces, bases or logistical support. That list is growing every 
day. 
Should such a mission prove necessary. its purpose is clear: to deliver a serious blow that will 
significantly diminish Saddamls weapons of ma,s destruction threaL. and reduce his ability to threaten 
his ueii;hbors. That is the objective we can and must meet to protect om· vital national in1erests. 
The most difficult decision any President has to make is to pu( our troops in harmsl way. ~o military 
mission i, without risk and cost. Even the bes{ prepared, best equipped forces will suffer losses. Bui 
should force become necessarv, the safetv of our men and women in uniform will be President Clinton! 
s top priority. And let me say: too, that. if military action becomes necessary, we will do what we can 
to avoid civilian casual!ies. 
If. in the aftermath of force, Iraq allows 1iNSCOM back in. so much the better. Unless it does so, !here 
is no prospect for ending economic sanctions. But if it does not, herels bow the world will look to 
Saddam in the weeks and moaths after force is used. 
~--1~ 
impact. f mass destruction threat and capacity to lash out at its 
· But we can have a real 
Second, Saddam \1ill know bv our . . 
we have evidence he is trv. . , ~ct1ons and our warning, that we will be . , . . 
lllOnilor franls act· . . , mg to rebuild his weapons of mass dest t· prepared lo act agam if 
, 1vu1es \nth our own · t tr · - rue 10 11 capabilities \V ·11 1 detect significant chea!'no Tl d Ill e igence methods. I have full c if'd . . . e w_1 c osely 
will need to b ' .,. ie emonstrated certaintv that lie .ll o1 I cnce m our ab1h1y to 
ecome part of Saddamls calculus in the,future ;t Jay a heavy price for his conduct 
Th' · le llited States will not go , , 
u·d, sanctions cannot be lift d a\\ a). 
tbe Iraqi regime. The roof , e so_long as UNSCO.M is unable to com let . . . . 
restrict the a I f P. can be lound m S~ddamls clespe I p e it,, nussion. Sanctions hurt 
of revenue n}~1l1;atoe oil lraq can sell and give the l.initecl- l\i:i:o:sa1~eon11tplslto lift them. They severely 
S · , sanctrons have cost I $ . · ~ 1 ro over Iraqis pr' add am would have toda h· d h . raq, 1 IO bill.ion in oil sales Im o. I . unary source 
• Y a e mvestcd e"cn a fraction of ti . · . a.,me t le armed force . 
115 money m rehabilit ( h · · • 
Sanctions are aimed a, ti I . . . . · a 1ng 1s m1htary. 
medicine T h I ie taqi iegune, not the Iraqi peopl f 
. . o e p Iraq genernte revenue to pav for su I f e. d Tom the ~lar1, we exempted food and 
, cl oo and med1c111e, the United States in 1991 
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propos~d_ U.~ . Security Council Resolutio ~ 
lo sen hm1ted_amounts of oi l and use tl1c /~~:~f• 712 and later986. They would have allowed 
~10n,tormg. Saddam rejected that offer rtr f'v c_s for ~umarutanan supplies -- subject to U 'I/ Iraq 
Os/age -.- while .spending What resources h 1i e rari, Ill effect taking the needs of his own .p. • I 
alllomobrles for bis cronies. . e 1ac on tal1an marble for 48 new palac , d eop e_ 
-es au expensive 
In J 996 Saddam finallv and oru I . I 
more th 3 ·11 · , e t gmg v accepted r 'I/ Sc . C 
bi . an i'." 1on fons of food have l)een deliver~~!; cunty . ouncil Resolution 986. Since then, 
sit~~~~~ t~e p1ograllJls operation and deploys his eo ~ the Iraqt peopl~. But t.o this clay, Saddam 
children \hi~ a_ppealmg to I~lernational public opiiuo!to ;, 't~uman sh1e1dsl _around suspected weap<>ns 
n pahents suffenng from a lack of vital n c1· . . e sanctions \nth uuagcs of starving Iraq· 
. I e icmcs. This is the mother of cruel dece . I 
Despite Saddam ls cvuical eff orfs to ma . l . phons. 
g:ierm\~ted to do aJ(wc can to make loitf~;._}~o~~~ P!1gttbof his people for political ends. we are 
nera s recommendation to increase !he roo \\_or etter. \Ve welcome the U.N. Secretai·v 
people, the less Saddam can spend on armf oram. The more Iraqi oil goes to feeding the Iraqi 
Fourtl1'. in the weeks and months ahead S dd .· 
Zones in southern and northern Iraq. Alre:dva~:v1~ ~no~,· that we will strictly enforce !he :-i o Flv 
t1f ~gl~dad to (he Kuwaiti border and over ~~rth;r~u[orcc controls the skies from the southern s~bw-bs 
ar~\f ~e co~~tnes and Turkey. \1/e have flown more ;~~i~/~ve;_ly reducing tl:e threat Iraq poses to 
decisive!~~'.~ lorm ... And Ollrf orce_s in !he Gulf are readv fore~ e orce thes~ 11\o Fly Zones I than in 
,, couute11ng any lllfeat ma matter of da)'S in~!e· d fpohnd to Iraqi aggression quickly and 
3 0 t e months 1t took in 1990. 
There are aUernatives to our app1·oach. I 
do not think thev b ·t . . 
S . , , es sene Arnencals national interests. 
- ome.~uggest we should meet Saddam half wa 'bv . 
~ens1tncl sites or to render V~SCO,'v! ineffecti~ , agreemg to dose our eyes to IPresidentiall . . 11-----~ 
imposed on and accepted by Iraq after the Gulf~ ~u:h a stunmng reversal of the V.!'•i: .. R~s 
llu·ea( to our securitv ru ' 1 ould be unacceptable -- and pose a . , · senous 
Others suggest that !he only effective solution is for U 
power. But the costs and risks associated ,1,•th h .S. ground forces to remove Saddam from 
~ur strategic interests -- containing the threai1ra~1;0 a vent~re are _high and not essential to achievina 
campaign and nsk large losses of our soldiers. ses to I ie region. It would require a major land 
TJJere is no question th t I l 
Secreta , , · · a_ rag anc the worJd \\'OuJd be better off if 
.· . r) AJb11ght said Ill :\farch, we would olad!v 11· .· Saddam were out of power. As 
,11th its neighbors and resume its rightful plate in ihe ork \1·1th_a _successor regime ready to li\'e ai peac.e 
no less. 1n tl1e meantime, we ha,·e worked with Ira i comm~mty of nations. The Iraqi people deser\'e 
.so. q opposttwn groups -- and we will c t' . . Oil Ullle lo do 
BUI as lono as Saclda ~1 • . . 
. e m r u~sem is Ill J)O\\·er we mus1 b 
ac110ns. \Vhen the i.nlernalional community ~veakens in~ prepared '? respond firmly lo his reckless 
emboldened. \.Vhen we stand as o11e Sac·l·da . tl he face of his ihreats, Saddam sim1>lv 1·s 
d o . • - m 1s 1warted Th t · I · · 
an~e1 ous tyrants. Sustainii10 our olicv w·u . . a. I~ t ie timeless lesson lo apply to 
t_ei'.s10n Wtth ow· friends and :flies, p And it \~'ilf~~u~e' consta~( ngilance. 11 ~,·ill from time lo lime cause 
:e11ously challenges tl1e international communitY \;ee !hat \\ ~ su~!am the will to act each time Saddam 
oest prospects for protecting ou: interests and p~·~serv•~:e ~nbt11·e1. ~'.ght c?urse. Staying with it offers the 
t e s a 11 } m a vital par! of the world. 
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